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Abstract   Uncertainty is a defining characteristic of fisheries. Fishermen make
decisions affecting their livelihood daily and even hourly, often with scant infor-
mation on which to evaluate alternatives. Cognitive psychologists and
behavioral economists have shown that decisions involving uncertainty often di-
verge substantially from what would be predicted by expected utility theory. I
review relevant findings from the literature on decision making under uncer-
tainty and previous empirical modeling of fishing decisions, and explore the
implications of a number of different behavioral theories on fishing decisions of
various types. Excerpts from ethnographic interviews of groundfish fishermen in
New England are used to illustrate how these fishermen deal with uncertainty in
decisions they make about when, where, how, and how long to fish. The inter-
views provide anecdotal evidence in support of prospect theory and other
behavioral hypotheses that appear to contrast with what would be considered
rational behavior from a neoclassical economics perspective.
Key words   Fisheries, risk aversion, prospect theory, uncertainty, heuristics and
biases.
JEL Classification Codes   D01, Q22.
Introduction
Uncertainty is a defining characteristic of fisheries. Fishermen make decisions af-
fecting their livelihood and their lives daily and even hourly, often with scant
information on which to evaluate alternatives. In modeling decisions of fishermen,
economists typically assume that fishermen behave rationally, using what informa-
tion is available to them to construct estimates of the expected utility of the choices
they face and selecting the choice with the highest expected utility (Wilen et al.
2002). Cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists have demonstrated that
actual decision making under uncertainty often diverges substantially from norma-
tive behavioral models based on expected utility theory (Camerer 2000). People
have been shown to exhibit a number of decision-making behaviors that systemati-
cally violate normative theories of rational behavior, and the resulting choices of
individuals, and on aggregate, can depart substantially from what models based on
expected utility theory would predict.
Given the prevalence of decision making under uncertainty in fisheries, it is
likely that these “non-rational” behaviors may have significant impacts on fishing
behavior and should be given consideration when modeling fishing decisions such
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as location choice, targeting, exit and entry, and compliance with regulations. Group
level decisions, such as support for increases or decreases in the total allowable
catch, may also be affected by decision behaviors that depart from standard eco-
nomic theory. Study of fishing decisions may provide validation or contradictions of
behavioral theories of decision making under uncertainty, as well as important new
insights that may have relevance beyond fisheries.
In this article I explain how insights from cognitive psychologists and behavioral
economists on decision making under uncertainty can improve our understanding of
and ability to predict behavior of fishermen. Following a review of the literatures on
decision making under uncertainty and fishing decisions, I present excerpts from
ethnographic interviews of groundfish fishermen in New England to illustrate how
risk preferences and various decision making behaviors and biases affect the choices
made by these fishermen. I then discuss the implications of prospect theory and re-
lated behavioral hypotheses for understanding the likely outcomes and impacts of
various policies and exogenous changes in fisheries. I conclude with a summary of find-
ings and suggestions for additional research on fishing decisions under uncertainty.
Behavioral Theories of Decision Making Under Uncertainty
Thaler (1985) notes that “the paradigm of economic theory is first to characterize
the solution to some problem, and then assume that relevant agents (on average) act
accordingly.” In modeling decision making under uncertainty economists typically
assume that individuals, on average, make decisions that maximize their expected
utility. However, analytical, experimental, and empirical studies have shown incon-
sistencies between actual decision making and expected utility theory. This has
motivated development and testing of behavioral decision theories that can better
explain observed choice behavior under uncertainty (Camerer 2000).
Experiments proposed by Allais (1953) in which individuals first choose be-
tween a certain gain and a gamble and then between two gambles demonstrated a
consistent violation of the substitution axiom of expected utility theory. Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory and later cumulative prospect theory
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992) as a way to explain the Allais “paradox” and other
apparent inconsistencies between choice behaviors and expected utility theory. In
contrast to expected utility theory, prospect theory proposes that individuals assign
value to potential gains or losses rather than to final wealth positions and substitute
decision weights for probabilities. The value function used to evaluate choices is as-
sumed to be concave for gains and convex for losses and generally steeper for losses
than gains (individuals are roughly twice as sensitive to losses as gains). The theory
predicts risk aversion when comparing uncertain gains and risk-seeking behavior
when comparing uncertain losses, but also loss aversion due to the steep slope of the
value function for losses. Much of the basis and support for prospect theory has
been experimental, but a number of empirical studies have found evidence of behav-
ior that supports prospect theory and conflicts with expected utility theory (see
Camerer 2000 for a review).
Prospect theory provides an explanation for risk aversion even when the stakes
of the individual decision are modest. Within the expected-utility framework, the
only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility function is concave. However,
Rabin (2000) shows analytically that expected-utility theory cannot explain appre-
ciable risk aversion over modest stakes since for any concave utility function, even
very little risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion
over large stakes. In contrast, prospect theory proposes that people evaluate the
probabilities of gains and losses relative to a reference point relevant for the indi-Are Fishermen Rational? 327
vidual decision as opposed to considering how their overall wealth will be affected.
Prospect theory also hypothesizes that in formulating decision weights, indi-
viduals tend to overweight very low probabilities, which can lead to apparent
reversals of risk preferences (e.g., risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for
losses). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that overweighting of low probabil-
ity outcomes is an explanation for the purchase of actuarially overpriced insurance
and for gambling. Studies of betting behavior at horse tracks lend support to pros-
pect theory’s conclusions relating to evaluation of low probability gains. In a study
of bettors in British horse races, Jullien and Salanie (2000) find that rank-dependent
utility models do not fit the data noticeably better than expected utility models, but
that cumulative prospect theory has higher explanatory power. Golec and Tamarkin
(1998) investigate the favorite-longshot bias in horserace betting where bettors tend
to bet on low return, high variance bets when favorites are both lower variance and
higher expected return. Their analysis suggests that bettors are in fact risk averse,
but are skewness loving. These findings are also consistent with prospect theory’s
supposition that individuals tend to overweight low probability outcomes and thus
overvalue longshots.
The initial work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) was followed by a substan-
tial amount of experimental and empirical work exploring a variety of other decision
making heuristics and biases that may explain how and why actual decision making
under uncertainty often leads to choices at odds with expected utility theory. Work
by Thaler (1985) supports the idea that people often bracket decisions narrowly,
considering the effect of a decision on their income or loss over a short period,
rather than how it may effect their overall wealth. As a result, they may fail to con-
sider opportunities to diversify risk over repeated similar decisions and thereby reap
the gains of choices with higher expected value without incurring the level of risk
apparent when considering each choice independently. A study of taxicab drivers
(Camerer et al. 1997) suggests that drivers tended to work longer hours on days
when hourly income was low in order to reach an income target and tended to quit
early on days when hourly income was high.1 Narrow bracketing also provides an
explanation for the tendency of people not to disregard sunk costs when making de-
cisions. Individuals tend to consider the net outcome including the sunk cost but do
not consider the longer outlook (Garland and Newport 1991).
A number of studies has shown that when faced with complex decisions with
limited information, people do not make choices consistent with Bayesian probabil-
ity estimates and expected utility theory, but instead tend to resort to simple decision
heuristics or rule-based behavior relying on principles, analogies, and exemplars
rather than utilitarian calculus (McFadden 1999, 2006). Camerer (1998) argues that
experimental and empirical evidence has shown that most people do not follow
Bayesian decision making and that there is little directed evidence of Bayesian up-
dating that cannot be explained with much simpler theories, such as anchoring and
adjustment. Experiments with a two-armed Bernoulli bandit problem (Gans, Knox,
and Crosson 2004) have shown that normative theories of decision making do not
describe or predict behavior as well as simpler myopic models such as exponential
smoothing or a simple “satisficing” model. Rather than seeking the arm that maxi-
mizes expected rewards, the subject is satisfied with any arm that meets some target
level of average reward per trial.
1 A follow-up study by Farber (2005) raised questions about the validity of Camerer’s results, suggesting
that the negative labor elasticity estimates could be the result of biased estimator. In particular, because
the dependent variable (hours worked) also appears in the denominator of the explanatory variable (rev-
enue per hour), it can produce a negative bias in the parameter estimate if there is observation error in
the number of hours worked.Holland 328
There is substantial evidence that, to the extent individuals are evaluating con-
ditional probabilities, they often do a poor job of it. Examples include: the
gambler’s fallacy, a belief that an event that has just happened is unlikely to reoccur
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974); the hot hand effect, the belief that a recent trend is
an indicator of future events (Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky1985); and the law of
small numbers, the belief that a small sample is highly representative (Tversky and
Kahneman 1971). Tversky and Kahneman (1971) observed excessive reliance on
readily retrieved information and a tendency to interpret supporting information as
confirming a prior hypothesis while discounting information that contradicts that
hypothesis. Psychological research indicates that people have a cognitive bias that
leads them to misinterpret new information as supporting previously held hypoth-
eses (Rabin and Schrag 1999). Experiments have also shown that people often fail to
sufficiently adjust expectations from an initial anchor in the light of new evidence
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
Experimental evidence also suggests the people are averse to uncertainty itself
as distinct from the risk associated with uncertainty. Camerer (1998) notes that this
provides an explanation for the Ellsberg paradox whereby many people prefer to bid
on either color of balls for an urn with known 50-50 ratio of balls rather than either
color from an urn with unknown ratio. This is particularly pertinent for understand-
ing fishing decisions where fishermen may not have sufficient information, or
predilection, to effectively evaluate the expected value of the alternatives they face.
Previous Studies of Uncertainty and Risk in Fishing Decisions
There is a substantial and growing literature devoted to understanding and modeling
fishing decisions, primarily fishery and location choice and entry-exit decisions.
These decisions are taken in a climate of considerable uncertainty, and several of
these studies have addressed issues of uncertainty and risk by examining the infor-
mation structure that supports decision making (e.g., Curtis and McConnell 2004;
Dupont 1993; Eales and Wilen 1986; Holland and Sutinen 2000; Salas and Gaertner
2004; Smith 2005; Wilen et al. 2002), by quantifying risk preferences (e.g.,
Bockstael and Opaluch 1983; Curtis and Hicks 2000,; Eggert and Martinsson 2004;
Eggert and Tveterås 2004; Holland and Sutinen 2000; Mistiaen and Strand 2000;
Smith and Wilen 2005; Strand 2004) and by identifying risk-coping strategies (Salas
2000; Salas and Gaertner 2004; Hilborn et al. 2001).
Most economists working on modeling fishing decisions have used random util-
ity models that assume we observe decisions that, on average, reflect utility
maximizing choices. This allows us to estimate an approximation of the utility func-
tion, which can be used to make predictions about how policies and other factors
may affect future decisions and what welfare impacts they may have. Most of these
studies have modeled expected utility as a function of either expected profit or ex-
pected final wealth given some initial endowment generally based on vessel value.
Expected revenue or profit is typically modeled as a weighted average of lagged
revenue or profit rates reported by vessels from a discrete fleet for specific locations
or fisheries over a discrete period of time. Several papers allow utility to be affected
by risk preferences by including the variance of expected revenue, profit, or final
wealth in the model specification. Most of these studies report negative signs on
these variables, which are interpreted as risk aversion. An exception is Holland and
Sutinen (2000), who report a positive sign on the coefficient of variation (CV) of
expected revenue. While this could be interpreted as risk-seeking behavior, they
suggest that it may simply reflect a failure to model the information structure cor-
rectly (fishermen may respond to reports of particularly high catches and theseAre Fishermen Rational? 329
locations tend to have high CV in revenue). This may be skewness-loving rather
than risk-loving behavior as has been observed in racetrack bettors (e.g., Goleck and
Tamarkin 1998).
To be consistent with expected utility theory, risk preferences must be assessed
by evaluating choice behavior in terms of the utility of the final wealth position and
probability of each alternative. Bockstael and Opaluch (1983) take this approach by
estimating a truncated Taylor-series expansion of an explicitly specified (log) utility
function. Risk preferences are evaluated with the parameter on the second moment
of the utility function. In practice, many empirical studies of fishing behavior that
have explored risk aversion in fishing decisions have not included initial wealth in
the utility function and only examine variability in expected profits or revenue. For
example Strand (2004) excludes initial wealth from the expected utility specification
noting that determining the initial wealth of agents is nearly impossible and can cre-
ate severe statistical problems by introducing error into the highly correlated terms
in the utility function. Strand also cites Kahneman and Tversky (1984) findings that
choices in lotteries are independent of initial wealth. Clearly exclusion or inclusion
of wealth can yield different estimates of relative risk aversion that can, in turn, lead
to different behavioral predictions and welfare estimates.
Eggert and Martinsson (2004) attempt to directly test whether risk preferences
of fishermen are consistent with prospect theory or expected utility theory using a
stated preference study administered to Swedish fishermen. Each fisherman evalu-
ated six pairs of alternative fishing trips with different means and ranges of possible
income. The authors note that risk-averse behavior for repeated stakes will lead to
substantial income reduction in the long run. Since the individual trips being evalu-
ated in each choice set involve relatively modest stakes in terms of their impact on
the fishers total lifetime wealth, expected utility theory would predict risk neutrality
in these decisions, while prospect theory would predict risk aversion. Eggert and
Martinsson found substantial heterogeneity in risk preferences in their sample with
48% characterized as risk neutral, 26% modestly risk averse, and 26% strongly risk
averse. They argue that these results are inconsistent with expected utility theory
and that research on fishing behavior should give more consideration to behavioral
theories of decision making under uncertainty (e.g., prospect theory).
None of the fishing decision studies that evaluate risk preferences explicitly
consider the potential effects of loss aversion on decisions where fishermen face the
possibility of a loss. However the possibility of not covering expenses and suffering
a net loss on a fishing trip is real. A key proposition from prospect theory, which has
been demonstrated repeatedly in experiments and several empirical studies, is that
individuals are loss averse. It is consequently important to understand whether indi-
viduals view uncertain outcomes as gains or losses. Loss aversion may be difficult
to distinguish from risk aversion, though it may manifest itself through avoidance of
fishing alternatives that pose significant risk of a loss. Furthermore, loss aversion
may relate not only to an absolute financial loss but also to failure to meet an in-
come target. Salas (2000) notes that some fishermen in the Yucatan who fish
independently and competitively in the part of the year when fishing is most lucra-
tive, pool their catch at other times of year when fishing is poor. Hilborn et al.
(2001) note that some risk-averse fishermen in a very short, intense, and volatile
spawn-herring purse seine fishery pool their catch, while other more risk-prone fish-
ermen fish independently.
A few studies of fishing decisions have shown that fishers may be slow to
switch to more profitable fisheries or fishing locations, preferring to continue with
familiar ones. Bockstael and Opaluch included a dummy variable for prior fishery
choice in their fishery choice model and found this variable to have a strong effect
on choices. They suggest that this “bias” in favor of past choices might partially re-Holland 330
flect conversion costs for switching, but that it might also reflect non-monetary val-
ues, such as a desire to stick with family traditions or pure inertia. In their model of
fishery and location choice for trawlers in New England, Holland and Sutinen
(2000) also include dummy variables for prior choices both in the recent past and
the previous year. Like Bockstael and Opaluch, they find past behavior to have a
positive impact on future choices, creating a strong bias against what appear to be
more profitable, but less familiar, fishing alternatives. They suggest that fisher’s ex-
perience in particular areas, or lack of it in others, may affect the true profitability
they would realize in those areas (or at least their expectations of profitability) and
thus influence choices. However they suggest that simple habit may lead fishers to
maintain traditional fishing patterns despite potential gains that might be derived
from changing these patterns. They, too, are unable to differentiate inertia from het-
erogeneity in profit expectations. In a study of gear choice of Swedish fishers,
Eggert and Tveteras (2004) find that the majority of fishers respond positively
(negatively) to increased mean (variability) of expected landings values for alterna-
tive gears, but that there is a strong tendency to chose the same gear used on the
previous trip. They also find substantial heterogeneity in risk preferences, that when
not accounted for explicitly in the modeling, can provide misleading results about
risk preferences. They find continued inertia in decision making remains even al-
lowing for heterogeneity in expectations and risk preferences. Using a mixed logit
model of repeated location choice decisions by California urchin divers, Smith
(2005) is able to differentiate state dependence from heterogeneity (which might re-
flect rational expectations of higher profits in areas where the individual has
experience). He finds that true state dependence (i.e., inertia) is an important deter-
minant of location choice. These studies suggest that modeling fishers as
maximizing expected utility, where the expected revenue or profit is modeled on the
basis or activities of other vessels, may sometimes lead to biased predictions of lo-
cation or fishery choices, specifically to predictions that fishers will be more
responsive to economic incentives to shift behavior than they actually will be.
While profitability is probably an objective of most fishermen, other factors
may be important as well. Personal risk associated with weather is a major determi-
nant of when fishermen make trips in the California urchin fishery (Wilen et al.
2002; Smith and Wilen 2005). Salas (2000) notes that fishermen in San Felipe,
Mexico, concentrate on meeting a quota of 300 kilos of catch per month in order to
maintain membership in a fishing cooperative. Roy (1998) reports that fishermen in
Newfoundland, Canada, have to fish a certain number of days per year to be able to
claim unemployment insurance. The interviews of fishermen in New England, dis-
cussed below, also find evidence of goal-oriented behavior and a variety of factors
(beyond profit maximization) that affect fishing decisions.
Self-described Responses to Uncertainty by New England Groundfish
Fishermen
I conducted ethnographic interviews with a number of fishermen that participate in
the New England multispecies groundfish fishery.2 The interviewees included cap-
tains of large and small trawlers and gillnetters fishing from ports in Maine and
Massachusetts. The primary focus of the interviews was the decision-making pro-
2 Ethnographic interviewing is an interviewing technique developed to allow researchers to describe
other cultures, while minimizing the bias introduced by the researcher’s preconceived notions and unfa-
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cess these individuals use when making decisions about when and where to fish, and
particularly how they deal with uncertainty and risk in that decision-making process.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. Excerpts from these interviews that
relate to decision making under uncertainty are discussed below.3
The interviews provide anecdotal support for risk aversion in decision making
and illustrate a variety of ways that fisherman cope with and reduce risk. While
many of the responses to risk discussed do not necessarily indicate behavior that is
inconsistent with expected utility theory, they make clear that fishermen deal with
uncertainty and risk in a variety of decisions and seek to avoid or mitigate risk in
most cases. The fact that risk aversion appears to influence repeated decisions for
modest stakes would appear to conflict with expected utility theory. The interviews pro-
vide some support for loss aversion and narrow bracketing predicted by prospect theory,
as well as some other behavioral hypotheses of decision making under uncertainty.
General Risk Aversion
The Northeast multispecies groundfish fishery underwent a substantial decline in the
mid 1990s and has yet to fully recover from the depletion of several key stocks. The
fishery, which is managed with a combination of individual effort limits, closed ar-
eas, and trip limits, has gone through a continuing series of effort reductions
coupled with additional area closures and trip limits designed to reduce fishing mor-
tality on key stocks. The reductions in the stocks together with reductions in
available fishing time, and more recently increasing fuel prices, have increased the
risks of incurring losses both on the fishing trip and annual levels. While fishermen
are by choice in a profession that is risky both in a physical and financial sense,
most of those interviewed made clear statements suggesting they were generally risk
averse and gave examples of ways that they attempt to mitigate risk and uncertainty
in fishing decisions.
For example, a captain of a small trawler in Portland, ME, when asked to com-
pare some fishing alternatives with different potential payoffs and risk stated:
I’d go for the sure bet. I’d go for less, guaranteed. I would make the safe
play. One thing that my father always told me was that what makes you in
the fish business is a consistent day’s pay, not the lucky strike or the big
strike. I always find the worst thing that happens to me is when I get a big
set of fish someplace that it’s not a high production area, you just stumble
across them, big accident. And it happens, doesn’t happen often but it
happens. It’s usually the worst thing that happens because you continually
go back looking for them and waste time instead of the constant production.
I guess I’m not a gambler.
A captain of a small gillnetter in southern Maine made these observations:
I’m a consistency person. I’d rather come in with a little bit less and have it
every day than go for the risky, pound your chest, I caught ‘em all. I’ve
been doing this a fairly long time. I’m fairly successful at it, so I must be
making the right decisions. I will always take my $2,000 a day even though
I know that at that particular time of year I ran off one time and I stocked
$8,000 in one day. You’re thinking in the back of your head that you can do
3 Names of the interviewees are withheld for confidentiality reasons.Holland 332
better, but the bottom line is you have a commitment for surety in this
business because there is so much uncertainty. You have a commitment to
make sure that you produce, and if you can produce at a moderate level, you
are much better off than jumping around trying to catch the million dollars.
I don’t know anybody that’s gotten really fantastically rich in this business.
Similar sentiments were expressed by a Portuguese captain of a large trawler out of
New Bedford, MA, in explaining how he decided whether to leave an area with
moderate catches when a cousin he sometimes fishes with let him know he’d found
a particularly good area several hours steam away. “Sometimes I go steady. Some-
times I go on my own. If I got a place steady, I prefer to go steady than to go to get a
jackpot. If I (after moving to the new location) don’t do well, I lost a day or two. I
don’t like that. I go steady. At the end of the day I make my numbers. Next day is
another good day.”
Wealth Effects
A number of the fishermen interviewed indicated that their relative wealth affects
their attitudes toward risk though opinions on the direction of the effect differed
amongst them. A midcoast Maine captain illustrates this by comparing his decision
not to reconfigure his trawler as a gillnetter when his friend, who was financially
secure, did so:
The richer the fisherman the more willing they are to risk usually. One
spring, gill netting was just starting to look good in our area and I added up
what I had and I figured it was going to take all the money I had in my
savings account to rig over from being a dragger to a being a gillnetter. And
I didn’t do it because I thought, well, if I spend all this money to rig over
and I don’t catch anything, then I’m screwed. I was pretty sure I could make
more money as a gillnetter and for a few years I could have. He (the friend
that was financially independent) on the other hand looked at that and he
rigged over as a gillnetter and he did a lot better. He had been a lobster
fisherman. He went from lobster to gillnetting. But that was a risk. If he’d
spent that money, he might have had to sell off a CD or a property or
something but wasn’t going out of business. Where if I’d spent all the
money I had and hadn’t made any money I’d been a lot deeper in debt. The
poorer you are the less risk you are likely to take; even though there might
be a bigger return.
When asked if that attitude toward risk applied for shorter term decisions such a lo-
cation choice he confirmed this: “Yeah it still holds true. If you’ve been going along
pretty steady for a few weeks and making a little money, you don’t mind going some
place and trying to make a little more money. But if you’ve just been scratching get-
ting by then you are less likely to go looking. Because you’ve still got to get by.”
A gillnetter from southern Maine expressed a nearly opposite view:
The more money I have, the less risk I take. I make sure that I am
profitable, but I’m not interested in going to Parker Ridge looking for
pollock in the middle of February any more. I don’t like the beating I took
out there. I don’t like the chances. Your tolerance to risk is directly related
to your bank account. When I was younger and I was looking at all the stuffAre Fishermen Rational? 333
I had to do and all the bills were coming in, I was banging the risk all the
time looking for that cash out. Now that I’ve built up a portfolio [of stock],
I’m comfortable, I can go awhile.
Coping with Price Risk
Price volatility adds significant extra risk on top of the risk associated with volatile
catch rates. Some fishermen actively try to manage this risk by targeting a mixture
of species or species with less volatile price:
You try to get a mixture of species if you can. You try to work on species
whose price is less volatile. Monks go up and down now, but for the whole
80’s monks were $2.50 a pound winter, summer, spring, or fall. You always
knew if you had 1,000 pounds of monks it was $2,500. Something like
redfish goes up and down like a yo-yo. They might be no value one day and
75 cents the next, so usually you won’t try to load your boat up with redfish
because you don’t know what you’re going to get out of them. If you are
working on flats and there’s the chance to get a few cod it’s a good bet
because they (the flats) may or may not be worth a lot. The species that are
more price stable are better to go after in general. If you’ve got that choice.
A Maine gillnetter expresses as similar opinion: “You tend to mix your species. It
goes back to putting all your eggs in one basket. If you can mix your species you’re
guaranteed you will hit on one and you’ll do well.”
Coping with Gear Risk
Fishermen also face the risk of losing gear, and that risk is influenced by the areas
fished. In some cases gear risk relates to the type of bottom or the presence of
wrecks, but ghost gear can also be a problem. A midcoast Maine fisherman talks
about a place he used to fish but doesn’t anymore because it has been popular with
offshore lobstering, and the large draggers (80-90 foot boats) have gotten into their
gear and spread it around:
If I get a stringer of them it stops me. If I get more than 4 or 5 of them in
my net I can’t lift it, and it’s a real bummer. Every time I fish out here, the
last five or six times, I lose about 25% of my time in interaction with fixed
gear. The volume of fish hasn’t been good enough to make up for the 25%
loss. I can fish somewhere else and catch less fish, but at the end of 24
hours I got the same amount with no hassle and no strain on the gear.
Willingness to fish in areas that might damage gear (e.g., rip nets) is affected by
weather as a captain of a midsize trawler out of Portland explains. “If I know there
is a piece of bottom where the fishing might be good but there is risk of net damage,
I won’t go there if the weather is cucky. The cuckier the weather the more likelihood
of doing net damage. And net damage is lost time and lost time is dollars per hour.”
Bad weather also increases the cost of dealing with gear loss. “It’s ten degrees and
light freezing spray. I am not going to go near any bottom that has a potential of net
damage because you got your men bare handed (trying to mend nets) and that’s just
brutal.” This captain is much more willing to take gear risks if the weather is fine.
“That’s the easiest one to make. If I thought I could move on riskier bottom andHolland 334
double the $400 a tow I’ve been making, I’m gone. I’d even sacrifice a tow. I’d
move 42 miles if I thought I could double my productivity even if the bottom is a
little risky.” He shows me an area on a nautical chart with some peaks marked with
colors and explains:
The green ones are the ones I know I can get over, the yellow ones have a
little more risk. The orange ones, you just completely avoid those unless
you have the tide and the wind and everything going with you and then you
risk going. I will go on some orange ones. Because I put them there I know
them. I know what the risk is. And if the weather conditions are perfect and
I see fish on the machine. Sometimes I’ll circumnavigate them and then tow
them the last 20 or 30 minutes of the tow.
For fixed gear fishermen the risk to gear may come from interactions with mo-
bile gear. A Maine gillnetter notes that there are areas you avoid because your gear
may get hit by trawlers. There are some small areas where your gear can get caught
up with coral, but he avoids those areas now. “It’s no decision for me; you don’t
trade gear for fish.”
Willingness to take risks with gear seems to have declined for some fishermen
as they have aged. A trawler captain in his 50s from New Bedford explained, “No, I
go for safe. All my guys are tired. My guys work for me for 20 years. My back is not
good. No more.” He explains that he used to do that when he was younger. “When I
started this life, I’m a tough captain. I put the net in the rocks to look for cod.”
Nevertheless many fishermen are willing to take a risk with gear at least some
of the time if the reward is high enough:
We know where the bad spots are, bad bottom. And usually sometimes
there’s fish over there. If you get 1,000 pounds and the next tow you get
200 pounds because your net ripped, but then you might get another 2,000
pounds your next tow, you can take a chance. But now if you keep tearing
up, you’re wasting a lot of time. And then you have to make a move. There
has to be fish for you to set on the hard bottom, enough to cover the
expense and the waste of the time…I’ll make an example. I go in the bad
bottom. I know if I go in the smooth bottom I can get 4,000 pounds a day.
But I’m going to take a chance on the hard bottom. If I get 8,000 or 9,000
pounds in 24 hours I might stay there because there’s more fish. At the end
of the day I see what I did for the 24 hours. If it works I’ll stay even if I
damage the gear. If there’s fish I’ll set out. I got gear for working hard
bottom.
A few trawler captains from New Bedford mentioned that they are less likely to
fish in areas where there is risk of tearing up nets, partly because they don’t have as
many or as experienced crew to mend them. This apparently relates to the fact that
overall profitability is down due to resource conditions and increased costs (fuel and
insurance), so they are working with smaller crews. In essence, lower profitability is
reinforcing risk aversion in keeping them away from hard bottom that might have
bigger payoffs but more risk. One captain explains, “You’ve only got four guys;
years ago it was six guys, seven guys. And they lose sleep, everyone gets tired, be-
cause you rip one net and then you got to set the other net, and that one gets ripped
up and then you got nothing.” Another New Bedford captain notes that years ago he
used to fish more in the shoal [shallow] water because he needed more money to pay
for the boat, but now the boat is paid for. He thinks even now that he could make
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the men. You have broken nets all the time. You have to have guys fast at mending
the nets. All the good guys have moved to the scallopers. The scallops are the ones
who make money. You got old guys like me. A long time ago we used to have six
guys on the boat. Now you got four. If we go in this water and break the net we’re
going to be stuck.”
Diversification of Risk Over Time and Across Activities
Although catch rates and income from tow-to-tow and day-to-day can be highly
volatile, it will tend to even out over the length of a multiday trip and even more so
over an entire season. To the extent that the risk associated with individual fishing
trips is independent, one from the next, fishermen could diversify risk over time and
thus pursue relatively risky strategies on a trip-by-trip basis if those strategies had a
higher expected value without incurring substantial risk in annual earnings. The in-
terviews suggest that these fishermen prefer consistent landings over the course of
the year, often bracket their decisions over relatively short time frames (a day or a
multiday trip), and may not take advantage of their ability to diversify risk over a
larger number of production decisions (e.g., a fishing season). A captain of a small
dayboat trawler in Maine notes, “A season is never made in a week and a week is
never made in one day. So I like to look for consistent production over a long period
of time rather than a day or a week. But in order to have that consistent production
you have to take chances although they are calculated chances. You cannot just con-
tinue to go back to the same area and expect that production.” One New Bedford
captain explained that he thinks about performance on a trip basis and doesn’t get
too worried on the tow-by-tow basis. However, he does say that, “After two or three
(bad) tows, yeah it messes you up. You need to make money. You got four people
with you. You got mortgage, rent, it’s not easy, kids in college.” He says he is wor-
ried more about his crew than himself when things are not going well. This may not
be just concern for their welfare; finding and keeping good crew has become in-
creasingly difficult.
One reason that captains may have become more concerned with short-term per-
formance is that the overall number of fishing days is strictly limited by regulation
now and the number has been declining with tightening regulations. Another New
Bedford, MA, captain notes, “If you lose three trips in a year, you’re in big trouble.
You go out there, you got to try to make a trip.” The restriction on total fishing time
makes it increasingly critical for fishermen to choose the right times to take trips. As
another Maine trawler captain explains:
Years ago we used to just go out and grind. Sometimes you wouldn’t catch
any fish for a week. If you didn’t catch anything you jumped around and
jumped around and jumped around. Eventually you found something. You
didn’t pay too much attention to the prices because, you know, some people
might say the prices are low and I’m not going but by the time you got your
fish to market they might be back up again. Used to be we just went out and
put our time in and did the best we could do and it all evened out at the end
of the year. Nowadays you have to think about whether you are burning a
day up for nothing, or should I save this day for May or save it till July
when I can make more money.
The ability of captains to fish only in the most profitable times of year may be
limited; several captains of larger vessels mentioned that they need to provide crew
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Many fishermen do diversify risk by participating in more than one fishery. A
captain of a small trawler in Maine has held on to a lobster license he doesn’t use in
case of further declines of groundfish. “I consider my lobster license an insurance
policy.” Another trawler captain from midcoast Maine who fishes for lobster,
groundfish, and shrimp at different times of year explains, “I’d be money ahead the
last ten years if all I did was go lobstering. But I kind of like to keep diversified
although that’s cost me in a way. It’s cost me in days at sea because of going
shrimping and going lobstering” [meaning his individual allocation of days at sea
for groundfish was reduced because he had logged fewer groundfishing days during
the qualifying period]. He notes, however, that part of the reason for being diversi-
fied is not just money; he likes groundfishing and shrimping better than lobstering,
he likes the hunt.
Loss Aversion and Target Income
Several fishermen indicated that they have income targets that influence their deci-
sions. These targets are related to operating costs, but may include opportunity costs
of labor as well. Failure to meet these targets may be thought of as a loss, and might
be avoided in favor of another strategy with a lower expected value, but less prob-
ability of failing to meet an income target. A captain of a gillnetter based in
Portland, ME, notes:
I have numbers I like to meet and it depends on what we’ve done previously
as to how long I can stay in an area and keep looking. If you had a big week
there and it starts to taper off, you can go on a little while and keep the crew
happy not making a lot of money if you already put some money in the
bank for them. But after a while if a guy is going out and only making $50 a
day, they are going to want to make more money.
A captain of a midsize trawler fishing out of Portland, ME, also indicates he has an
income target. “We have a nut. I got my fuel costs, grub costs, ice costs, and so
forth, so I got a nut. It takes about 3 or 4 days to break the nut. And the next two
days; that’s our profit. The goal for these boats is to stock $3,000 to $4,000 a day.”
Income targets are clearly adjusted over time in response to fishing conditions as
well as price, as comments by another fisherman illustrate, “Yeah. That changes a
lot. Used to be shrimping I’d like to stock a couple thousand dollars a day back
when shrimp were a $1 pound. This year I’m happy to stock $1,000 although my ex-
penses are higher. It’s unrealistic to think I’m going to stock $2,000.”
If fishermen set an income target, and perceive not making that target as a loss,
prospect theory would suggest that they may tend to fish longer when catch rates are
poor and go home early when they are good, but the responses in interviews were
mixed. One fisherman suggests he may fish longer when conditions are particularly
good, but sometimes may go home early.
When you’re not making anything you got to fish hard because you’re not
making anything. When you’re making money you want to fish hard because
you’re making money. Occasionally if you’ve been working hard and you make
unexpected money early you might quit early, especially if you don’t think it’s
going to hold up all day. If you’ve had a couple of really good tows in the
morning and then you drop off, then you are more likely to go home early. If
it’s stayed steady all day, then you are more likely to stay and get what you can
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Another fisherman explains, “I’ll put a good faith effort into going to other
spots. I won’t just go out and say there’s nothing here, I’m going home and be a lazy
guy. I will go and I’ll do a progression and look for some fish. If it ends up that I’m
like a cat chasing my tail and there’s nothing there, I’ll put the full day in and I’ll go
home.” When asked what he would do if the fishing is better than expected he re-
sponded that it depends whether he is going to be constrained by trip limits on some
species (that might require discarding), and what the outlook is for fishing the next
day. “If I know I can get out the next day I’ll just put my day in, which is basically
to be back in by 6:00, so that I can get back out and do it again the next day. I don’t
fish at night.”
A few captains of large trawlers that make multiday trips suggested that they
would tend to shorten (lengthen) trips when fishing had been particularly good
(poor). Cutting a trip short may be quite rational to increase the chance of landing
when there is less fish being landed and the price is higher. For example, if all the
boats left port on the same day after a storm, heading home early might mean get-
ting a better price. “After six days you look at what fish you have in the hold, you
look at the price in the market. Sometimes, especially in the winter time, if all boats
left on the same day (after a storm), you need to pay attention to price. If the market
has no fish, sometimes the fish is so high. If you have 40,000 (pounds), 50,000, it’s
better for me if I come sell those fish for a high price.” The same captain explained
that he may lengthen a trip when fishing has been poor and may stay out a few more
days, “Sometimes if I don’t make enough money to pay my crew, I make one or two
days more. If I can get $5,000 or $10,000 more it’s OK.”
It should be noted that in some fisheries what might appear to be income targets
may actually result from marketing arrangements. For example, in both the ma-
hogany quahog and shrimp fisheries in Maine, many fishermen are fishing to fill
explicit orders from dealers.4 If fishing is good they may return home early simply
because they have no market for any additional catch.
If fisherman are bracketing risk at the level of the trip and are generally risk
averse but are also loss averse, we might expect to see different kinds of behavior
toward the end of the trip depending on whether they are above or below their in-
come target. If they are well below the target they may actually be willing to explore
some risky options if they have a chance of bringing the trip revenue above the tar-
get. On the other hand, if they are above the target they may be unwilling to take
risks. Again, the insights from interviews show some support for this, but also sug-
gest that fishermen may pursue riskier alternatives toward the end of a trip even on
good trips. A captain of a small trawler from Maine states, “Usually you are more
likely to take more risks later in the day, whether it’s been a good day or a poor one.
If it’s been a poor day you’ll take the risk because you want to salvage the day. If
it’s a good day you’ll take the risk because you’ve already made a day’s pay and
you’re not out as much. Especially if you know the next day is going to be a bad day
weather wise.” The captain quoted in the previous paragraph who may lengthen trips
that have had poor fishing suggests he is risk averse in choosing fishing locations for
these last days. “If there are no fish around, it’s better to go for the safe most of the
time.” He explains that if he has been out there that long and hasn’t found fish, there are
probably not good places to go to find a lot of fish, “it’s better to just stick with it.”
In some cases the decision to pursue more uncertain alternatives toward the end
of a trip appear to be related to the value of the information generated for future
trips, as a captain of a small trawler in Maine explains.
4 I observed this firsthand as an observer on trips in each of these fisheries and have been told this by a
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Eight out of ten times I would go for something different. Now it may be a
big score for that day. But really the determining factor would have nothing
to do with that day, but it would be where I’m going to approach the next
week or the next day. I might even just make a short sample just to see if
that’s the direction these fish are going. Whether they are going deep,
whether they are going shoal. If things are drying up I want to broaden my
horizons. I want to know what direction I’m going to go with my fishing
practices next week. Because I don’t live from day to day. I’m looking for
long-term production. I’m looking for options down the road.
Uncertainty Aversion
In some cases, it may be aversion to uncertainty rather than risk aversion that may
be driving behavior, though the two may be difficult to distinguish since individuals
have generally lower profit expectations for unfamiliar areas. One fisherman noted,
“If I’m fishing here and I’m getting 600 pounds a tow, I’m going to stay. Because I
don’t know what’s over there, I know what’s over here.”
Fishermen may have a legitimate reason to expect they will do better in an area
they are more familiar with, even if other fishermen appear to be doing better else-
where and they are aware of that. A fisherman explains:
If there are two tows where you think you are going to catch an equal
amount of fish, most likely you’ll go to the one you are more familiar with
because you are less likely to rip up and you are more familiar with it.
You’ve got the home court advantage. So Fred might be more likely to fish
over there because he’s fished there more in the past and I’m more likely to
fish here because I’ve fished here more. All things being equal he’ll go
there and I’ll go here. But if I talk to him and he’s doing twice what I’m
doing, I’ll go over there where he is. I usually figure I’m not going to do
quite as good as he will because he knows his way around there better and
it’s the same when he comes over my way. You have a better idea of which
part of the tows the fish are usually in. Usually the fish aren’t spread evenly
over the tow. You have a better idea of where the nooks and corners and
hangs are.
In both cases, it may be that the individuals are choosing the more certain alterna-
tive because it is less risky or because they simply hold a higher profit expectation
for the area that is familiar. However, there appears to be a component of uncer-
tainty aversion as well.
Rule-based Behavior, Qualitative Categorization, and Non-monetary Objectives
Individuals faced with complex decisions involving uncertainty have been observed to
follow rules of thumb or decision-making heuristics that work for them, but that are not
really an attempt to maximize utility, at least at the level of the individual decision. This
was described quite well by the captain of a small trawler fishing out of Portland, ME:
I have an almost instinctive thought process every time I leave the dock and
I don’t even realize I’m doing it. Say it’s for groundfish in July. There are
four or five key areas that I would like to hit, that are historically very
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step aboard the boat. When I get aboard the boat the second factor will be
the weather. Why the weather is important is that each one of those areas
have better performance characteristics to the weather. It is a safety issue,
but, to a degree, comfort is an issue. Let’s say I can get my 800 pounds of
codfish (the trip limit on cod); it’s blowing southwest 20, they are giving it
to blow 30 the rest of the day, the tide’s coming. I’m going to steam down
to the Southwest, into it, so the tide’s not stacking them up, it’s going to be
a comfort issue. I’m going to hit a hump that I’m pretty sure I can get my
cod within one tow, maybe two, and then when the tide turns and the wind
really starts stacking them up, all I have to do is just ride it right home. Get
a day’s pay and ride it right home.
Comments in a number of interviews suggest that fishermen tend to evaluate al-
ternatives qualitatively rather than developing a numerical estimation of the
expected value to be used in comparing alternatives. For example, one fisherman ex-
plained he chose to fish in an area because, “I got a good sign of haddock, good sign
of cod.”
When alternatives are evaluated qualitatively it is much easier for a fisherman
to consider factors that may not affect the expected profit of a choice alternative.
Several comments by fishery demonstrate that there are non-monetary factors that
influence their decisions both in terms of a long term fishing strategy and on a daily
basis. A captain of an small, and quite old, trawler in Portland, ME, said that he has
chosen an older small boat so he has low costs and can afford to fish close to home
and be home at night. “It’s a lifestyle choice.” Another fisherman notes that there
may be a sort of labor-leisure trade-off even during a trip. “I like the most value for
the least amount of work I have to do. That’s why I prefer flatfish over roundfish
(since it does not have to be gutted) and monks over groundfish” (often only the
tails of monkfish are landed). The same fisherman also expresses concern about
catching small fish, partly because of the extra work of handling more, less valuable
fish, but also because of conservation concerns:
I guess I’m not in it for the money. I mean I do it to make my living. But,
I’m not always out to make the maximum amount of money I can. A few
years ago those small dabs were down there in the deep water. Some
fellows I know were down there catching 10,000 pounds a day at 35 cents.
That’s a lot of work and you’re killing all these small fish. I could fish up
inside there and catch a few codfish and few monkfish and make two-thirds
as much money and not have to handle that volume of fish. And I just didn’t
like the idea of working on fish that are just barely legal size.
Discussion
The way that fishermen deal with uncertainty in decision making has important im-
plications for understanding and predicting fishing behavior and for designing
policies intended to influence behavior. While it would be useful to undertake a rig-
orous analysis, a simple conceptual discussion serves to highlight some potentially
important policy implications of prospect theory (and other behavioral hypotheses)
for understanding fishing decisions under uncertainty.
In contrast to expected utility theory, prospect theory predicts risk aversion
(risk-seeking) for decisions involving modest gains (losses) and a tendency to
bracket decisions narrowly rather than consider expected value and risk over re-
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toward fishing locations and strategies with lower variability in earnings on a trip-
by-trip or perhaps even a tow-by-tow basis. The impact of risk preferences on
fishing decisions should be considered when designing policy measures that are
meant to influence behavior by altering the relative profitability of fishing locations
or strategies. Risk preferences may substantially alter the level of economic incen-
tives required to influence behavior. As the interviews with trawler captains
demonstrate, the effects of risk aversion on fishing location choices may have im-
portant implications for the species composition of catch at the fleet level. In
fisheries managed with input controls, this could lead to over harvest of species that
are more evenly distributed (i.e., with lower variability in catch rates) and of species
with more consistent prices.
Heterogeneity in risk aversion across sectors or the industry may have important
consequences for how industry structure is affected by alternative management sys-
tems. For example, Bergland and Pederson (2006) show analytically that if one
group (a coastal fleet) has strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion and the other
(offshore fleet) is risk neutral, the original quota allocation will affect the equilib-
rium quota price, as well as the final distribution of quota between the groups.
Assuming increasing marginal costs, they argue that a redistribution of initial quotas
from the ocean fleet to the coastal fleet leads to higher economic efficiency in the
case of strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion in the fishing industry. Under the
same assumption, an increase in the TAC level will lead to the highest total expected
profit in the fishing industry if the additional quota units are distributed to the
coastal fleet.
Loss aversion could affect a variety of fishing decisions. As Camerer et al.
(1997) argue, loss aversion, together with narrow bracketing, could lead to short-
term negative labor supply elasticity. This effectively undermines the economic
efficiency of the fleet and, potentially, its total catch when regulated with effort con-
trols (though some might consider this a positive outcome). Loss aversion may also
aggravate physical risk by causing individuals to continue fishing rather than return
to port when bad weather is approaching. This may be accentuated by convexity in
the value function for losses, which motivates risk-seeking choice behavior in evalu-
ating losses.
Loss aversion and risk preferences may be quite important to understanding
how fishers will respond to economic penalties, such as fines for infractions of regu-
lations, though it is not at all clear what those effects might be. On the one hand,
prospect theory would suggest that because of the convexity of the value function
below the reference point, individuals may be risk-seeking in losses, which would
tend to increase the fine needed to assure a given level of compliance. This would
seem to apply if a fisherman was considering an action that would avoid a sure loss
(e.g., fishing in a closed area to avoid a money losing trip) against the potential fine
if caught. On the other hand, a decision with both the potential for a loss and a gain
can create the opposite effect. A potential loss from a fine may outweigh a probable
gain from an illegal action due to the greater steepness of the value function below
the reference point. Also, if the probability of being caught is very small but the
penalty is high, individuals may tend to overweight these low probabilities which,
like loss aversion, would tend to create a stronger compliance response to a given
level of fine. In sum, while it seems likely that insights from prospect theory would
be useful in designing a compliance system, it is difficult to generalize how those
insights might affect optimal design. A key factor may be whether the compliance
strategy relies on high fines and a low probability of detection or lower fines with a
moderately high probability of detection. The former may motivate risk-averse be-
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A recent experimental study on compliance with a tradable permit system found
that subjects that were predicted to buy permits had higher levels of violation than
those who were predicted to be sellers (Murphy and Strandlund 2007). The authors
suggested that this could be due to an endowment effect for holders of permits
(whereby, all else equal, those that already hold permits would value them more
than those considering buying them). The kinked value function proposed by pros-
pect theory might also explain this behavior. A holder of permits is comparing a
risky gain from selling the permit to a potential loss associated with getting caught
not complying (having sold their permit). A buyer, on the other hand, faces a choice
between a certain loss from having to buy the permit and a gamble from buying one
that might not be needed.
As noted earlier, a few studies have documented a tendency of fishermen to
avoid, and apparently undervalue, relatively unfamiliar fishing options in favor of
more familiar ones. While some of this may be explained by heterogeneity in prefer-
ences or the lack of specialized information or skills that reduce the expected utility
of these unfamiliar options, simple inertia appears to be a major factor. One expla-
nation for that inertia is uncertainty aversion. Individuals avoid these areas not
because their expected value is necessarily lower, but simply because their estimate
of expected value is much less certain. This would be consistent with empirical re-
sults from fishery and location choice studies, though it may be difficult to
demonstrate the causality. When considering how to design economic incentives
meant to influence fishing behavior, such as bycatch fees or fines for various regula-
tory infractions, it may be important to explicitly consider the information available
to fishers. In some cases it may be possible to increase the effectiveness and re-
sponse to economic incentives by improving the quality of information available to
fishers (though there could be cases where the converse is true).
Most of the examples discussed in this article relate to decisions of independent
operators. It may be that behavior in large industrial fisheries, with fleets of vessels
operated by large firms, may be less prone to some of the choice heuristics and bi-
ases discussed here. Also, in rights-based fishery management systems, markets (for
quota) may tend to force out operators that are less efficient, which may move aver-
age behavior closer to normative predictions based on expected utility theory.
Loss aversion and risk preferences toward potential losses may also have inter-
esting implications for evaluating how groups of stakeholders may consider
management decisions. Consider, for example, how a group of stakeholders would
evaluate the relative benefits of accepting a cut in their total allowable catch (TAC)
in response to a stock assessment that suggests the stock has declined and that a fail-
ure to reduce the TAC may result in a further decline or collapse of the fishery. If
stakeholders are risk-seeking in losses and loss averse, they may be reluctant to take
a cut in the TAC, which represents a certain loss in the upcoming year, even when
the discounted expected value of the income stream that would result from taking
the cut exceeds that of not doing so. Whether group decision making tends to be
more “rational” than individual decision making is a question that has received little
attention to date.
Conclusions
Choice behavior that is consistent with prospect theory may differ substantially from
what would be predicted by expected utility theory. Various choice heuristics and bi-
ases in formulating value expectations may result in decisions that, even on average,
depart from what standard economic theory would predict. There is, up to now, littleHolland 342
in the way of empirical studies that document whether choice behavior in fisheries
is consistent with prospect theory or inconsistent with expected utility theory and
“rational” behavior. Although a number studies of fishing behavior reveal risk pref-
erences and choice behaviors that appear inconsistent with expected utility theory,
the stated preference study by Eggert and Martinsson (2004) provides the only di-
rect test of this question. The ethnographic interviews of New England fishermen
discussed herein provide some anecdotal evidence in support of prospect theory and
other behavioral hypotheses (e.g., rule-based behavior, uncertainty aversion, qualita-
tive categorization, etc.) that appear to contrast with what would be considered
rational behavior from a neoclassical economics perspective, However, an empirical
analysis is needed to confirm whether these behaviors are widespread.
The discussion in the previous section illustrates a number of ways in which be-
havioral theories of decision making under uncertainty can lead to different
conclusions about the expected outcomes of policies and environmental and eco-
nomic changes in fisheries. The importance of accounting for these behaviors in
modeling fishing behavior and in designing fishery policy will vary from case to
case, but there is clearly a need for more consideration of these theories in the con-
text of understanding fishing decisions. There has been almost no empirical research
on fisheries that attempts to directly test the validity of expected utility theory vs.
prospect theory, or for the use of various other decision-making heuristics and bi-
ases by fishermen in making decisions under uncertainty. In addition to empirical
studies, experimental economics may be a useful way to improve our understanding
of how these decision-making behaviors will influence the outcomes and impacts of
policies or exogenous changes in fisheries.
When modeling fishing decisions, there should be more explicit consideration
given to how fishermen incorporate information into complex decisions, what infor-
mation they actually use, how they formulate expectations, and how they actually
make decisions. Are fishermen truly formulating accurate conditional probability
expectations and making dynamically optimal decisions or are they following
simple decision strategies? Are they gathering and acting on information from a net-
work or just relying on their own information? Are there consistent biases in how
they formulate expectations of expected profit? Are there non-monetary factors in-
fluencing choices? Over what time frame are fishermen evaluating fishing strategy
choices? How are decisions impacted by risk preferences, and are those risk prefer-
ences more consistent with prospect theory than expected utility theory? If our goal
is to understand and predict fishing behavior and design more effective fishery man-
agement tools, it is critical to understand how fishermen actually make decisions,
not how economic theory suggests they should make them. There is growing evi-
dence that the two may be quite different and that predicted outcomes, even at the
aggregate level, may diverge substantially from expectations as a result.
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